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Materialism Does Not Save
the Phenomena— and the Alternative
Which Does
Uwe Meixner
Usually, materialism is attacked by way of a priori arguments: deductive argu­
ments that make crucial use of a priori premises. But ‘a priori premise’ can mean
one of two things. An a priori premise in one sense (the strict sense) is a premise
that can be shown to be true without recourse to empirical data; an a priori
premise in another sense (the loose sense) is a premise that— though true or
false— cannot be shown to be false, but cannot be shown to be true either (with
or without recourse to empirical data). The anti-materialistic argument of René
Descartes (particularly as I construe it1) and the anti-materialistic argument of
David Chalmers2 are built on a priori premises in the second sense, which means:
it cannot be shown to be false that there is a possible world in which I exist without
anything physical existing— Descartes’ master premise— and it cannot be shown
to be false that there is a possible world in which everything physical is just like it is
in the actual world, but without anything conscious existing— Chalmers’ master
premise— but neither is it the case that either Descartes’ or Chalmers’s master
premise can be shown to be true— in such a manner that every rational person
had better believe that it is true on taking cognizance of the demonstration, which,
by the way, might simply consist in the presentation o f what is self-evident.
Obviously, a priori arguments that are based on a priori premises in the second
sense— one might call them metaphysical premises— are vulnerable to rational
doubt. W hat cannot be shown to be true can be rationally doubted— even if it
may so turn out that it cannot be shown to be false either. Materialists, o f course,
have widely availed themselves of this rational possibility for doubt.
1 See Descartes (1985a) and the Neo-Cartesian Argument in Meixner (2004).
2 See Chalmers (1996).
W hat I will offer here is not another a priori argument against materialism.
Rather, my aim is to point out some empirical data— empirical phenom­
ena—  that quite strikingly militate against materialistic views regarding human
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nature But it should be kept in mind from the start that these data, though
empirical, are relevant for conceptual decisions (hence for matters that are tradi­
tionally regarded as falling within the province of the a priori), as will become
rather apparent in the last section of this chapter. These data are of such a
fundamental nature that they, unlike the usual empirical data, affect the choice
between various conceptual frameworks, not just the choice between various
theories within a given conceptual framework.
1. W H E R E  AM I?
In Philosophical Foundations o f Neuroscience (Bennett and Hacker 2003), the
two authors attack what they call ‘the mereological fallacy’ in neuroscience.
According to them, psychological predicates can only apply— for conceptual
reasons— to human beings as wholes, not to parts of them, in particular not to
their brains. I am far from having Bennett’s and Hacker’s utter self-assurance
in adjudicating what is conceptually correct or incorrect. Their judgments seem
problematic to me in many cases, even if it is presupposed that the standard
of conceptual correctness is to be set by ordinary (or natural) language. What
seems absolutely certain to me is that some psychological predicates apply— in
their primary, literal, non-analogical, non-metaphorical sense— to me. But what
am Z? W hat are we? This is a deep and difficult question, and Bennett and
Hacker do not seem to have fully appreciated the full extent of its depth and
difficulty, or they would not be so dismissive of the recent materialistic attempts
to answer it, as well as of the earlier, dualistic ones. I submit, if these attempts
fail, something more than just a neglect o f ‘conceptual hygiene’ (ibid.: 116) is
responsible for it.
But rather than dwell on this, I will, first, consider a question that seems
much easier to answer than the question of what is the ultimate nature of my
(and our) being: Where am I? Well, I am now here, of course. And where is here
where I am now, at £#, for example? A true answer seems to be this: I am at to
precisely where my body is at to. However, this answer is not without difficulties.
Prima facie, the further question, 'Where is my body (now, at r#)?,’ is taken to
ask for the place in which my body is at But there is no such unique place.
Places (for three-dimensional objects) are three-dimensionally extended regions
in space— located, undivided volumes of space— and hence there certainly are
infinitely many places in which my body is a t0 . In all o f these infinitely many
places I am, too, if I am a to precisely where my body is at to. This, surely, is
much more than I ask for when I ask, ‘Where am I?’
It seems that this difficulty can easily be overcome. 'The place in which my
body is at to is, of course, intended to mean the same as ‘the smallest place
in which my body is at tgy or in other words: 'the place which is at to exactly
occupied by my body.’ Yet, is there any such place? A place lQ is at t0  exactly
occupied by my body if, and only if, (1) every part of my body is at to in Iq -> and
(2) there is no part of l0  in which there is at to no part of my body. The first
condition alone is certainly satisfied, by many places; but the first and second
condition together may easily be unsarisfiable. Suppose my body has at to isolated
proper parts: proper parts of it that are surrounded by empty space. Then there
is no place which fulfills conditions (1) and (2) together. And is it not true that
my body has at to isolated proper parts? It seems otherwise only as long as we do
not descend to the micro-level of mereological composition.
Another difficulty for the idea that I am at to precisely where my body is at
to— a difficulty of a quite different nature than the one just described, and a
difficulty which remains even if it be decreed that I am at to precisely in what
is for all practical purposes the smallest place in which my body is at to (that is,
the place where the water would not go if my body, mouth closed, were at to
submerged in water) —  is the following difficulty: I can look at my feet resting ar
to on the seat o f a chair, and I can look at my hands resting at to on my thighs,
and there is a sense in which the following two questions and two assertions
make perfect sense (the two assertions being even true in that sense): 'How far
away from me is at to the tip of my left big toe?’ —  ‘How far away from me is at
to the tip of my right pinkie?’ —  ‘My hands [or my gloves] are at to nearer to me
than my feet [or my shoes].’— ‘My head [or my cap] is at to nearer to me than
my feet [my shoes], and even nearer to me than my hands [my gloves].’3 But
how can this be if I am a to precisely where my body is at to? Obviously, I must
be somewhere else at to than my body is. But where am /, then?
Here is an experiment that will determine where I (really) am at a certain
time. Its central idea is that I am in the location— place or point in space— from
which I am looking at the world (or rather: at whatever it is in the world that
I am looking at). Thus, the experiment determines from which location I am
looking at the world at a certain moment of time. I am sitting upright on a chair
with my head immobilized (for, clearly, the location from which I am looking at
the world may change when I move my head). I am looking straight ahead, at a
white wall on which there is, at the height of my eyes, a pattern of black dots,
like this:
3 A few months after I wrote this, I discovered that at least one other philosopher had had such
convictions: G. E. Moore. In van Inwagen (1995: 121), Moore is quoted as saying, ‘I am closer
to my hands than I am to my feet,’ and rhe source of this is indicated to be White (1960). Van
Inwagen calls Moore’s conviction ‘extraordinary’ (van Inwagen 1995: 177). The conviction seems
commonplace to me, and presumably seemed so also to Moore. Interestingly, Moore also drew a
similar conclusion from it. The original passage in White (1960: 806) is this: ‘He [Moore] insisted
that he was quite distinct from his body, and one day said that his hand was closer to him than his
foot was.’ White describes Moore as a believer in Cartesian dualism (ibid.).
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In front of the white wall, at a certain distance from it and from me— namely,
just within my arm’s reach— there is a very thin but rigid transparent screen. I
am looking at the wall and at the pattern on the wall through that screen. I close
my left eye, and with a fine marker I mark the location on the screen where the
tip of the marker seems to me to coincide with a dot on the wall. I do this with
regard to all sixteen dots. This yields a dot-by-dot projection of the sixteen dots
on the wall onto sixteen dots on the screen. Next, sixteen straight lines are drawn,
each line being uniquely determined by a dot on the wall and by the dot that
corresponds to it on the screen. The point in space where these lines intersect
or the region in space where they maximally converge, there I was during the
experiment.
Consider also the following, somewhat more exciting way of determining
where I am: If I— without non-negligible fault: accurately— aim a rifle at the
colored center of a glass ball sitting on a pedestal, then a certain straight line is
uniquely picked out: it is determined by the center of the ball and by the point in
space where the bead of the rifle is located when it seems to me to coincide both
with the center of the ball and with the rifle’s rear sight. I —  the subject of this
action of aiming a rifle and, at the same time, the subject of the visual experience
through which, so to speak, that action takes place— am somewhere on that line,
or at any rate very near to some point on it. But can my location be known
more precisely? Yes, it can. Let the former line be recorded (by measuring the
coordinates of its determining points), and let me now aim the rifle accurately
at the center of another glass ball sitting on a pedestal, so near to the first one
that, in aiming the rifle, I do not need to move my head. Hence there is a second
aim-line, which is determined in a way completely analogous to the way in which
the first aim-line was determined. I am — as long as the aiming lasts— where the
two lines intersect, or at any rate within the region where the two lines— and
others generated just like them— come nearest to each other.
There are four possible general results: either my location (at a certain time)
that is determined by these experiments— by increasing the number of dots
on the walls, or the number of acts of aiming the rifle, the accuracy of my
localization can be increased to any desired degree— is entirely inside of my
body (though possibly encompassing points of its surface), or merely zzz4 its
surface, or entirely outside of my body (though possibly encompassing points
of the surface), or partly inside and partly outside of it. In all four cases, I
do not spatially coincide with my entire body. Therefore, I am not identical
to my body, nor am I identical to a psychophysical unity from which my
entire body can be abstracted as its physical constituent (for then, too, I would
have to spatially coincide with my body). If I am merely in the surface of my
body, or entirely outside of my body, or partly inside and partly outside of it,
then it is clear that I cannot be a physical entity. For nothing physical that is
4 Though unusual, ‘in’ is more accurate than ‘on’ here.
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merely in the surface of my body or at least partly outside of that body can
be me, If I am to be a physical entity, I must be entirely inside of my body.
Yet, whatever it is that is physical and occupies the location in my body that
the experiments might conceivably determine as my location, it will certainly
not be a likely candidate for being me. Therefore, wherever I am found to
be located by the described experiments, nothing physical located there could
with any likelihood be me. I am, therefore, not a physical entity (discounting
the possibility that I might be a physical entity that is not located where I
am found to be located by the experiments, but somewhere else; regarding
this possibility, see below). Hence, since I certainly exist, I exist non-physically
(though, of course, not independently of my body, not now and, in all likelihood,
not ever).
Some, instead of accepting this conclusion, will undoubtedly prefer to conclude
that since I am not a physical entity, I do not really exist, but have the same
ontological status a center of gravity has: the status of a useful fiction.5 For mcy
with my subjective certainty of my real existence, this conclusion can hardly
be acceptable, of course. But there are some further considerations— which are
independent of my physical or nonphysical status— that may also convince other
people than me that I really exist. (1) It cannot be denied that it seems to me
that I really exist. Hence, if one assumes that I do not really exist, then one
must also assume that I am under the illusion that I really exist. But, doubtless,
whatever is under an illusion really exists. (2) It is simply not plausible that I
do not really exist, since I am operative in carrying out the experiments which
determine my location— experiments that depend crucially on how specific
aspects in my experimentally prepared environment visually seem to me when I
complete doing certain specific things with my instruments (the marker, the rifle),
which doings are persistently intended by me to bring about precisely those visual
seemings of mine— doings I  persistently direct so as to make it really happen
that I  have these visual seemings (visual seemings that may, moreover, lead to
dramatic consequences, as is evident if I aim my rifle— loaded, with the safety
catch off— and pull the trigger).
The described experiments are meant to determine my location by determining
my eye-pointy my center o f  perspective y assuming that where my center of perspective
is, that there, precisely, I am myself. This might be disputed. Perhaps I am not
where my center of perspective is (but am a physical entity after all and
located somewhere else). However, these doubts can be allayed. Perspective is
standardly defined as the art of picturing objects in such a way as to show them
as they ‘appear to the eye’ (with regard to shape).6 But this definition, taken
literallyy is faulty, for nothing whatever ‘appears to the eye,’ just as nothing
whatever appears to a camera. The perfect definition of perspective— the literal
5 See the views on the self in Dennett (1991).
6 Cf. Webster s New World Dictionaryy  the Second College Edition of 1976.
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expression of what is non-literally conveyed by the previous definition— is that
perspective is the art of picturing objects in such a way as to show them as
they appear to us from where we are in space. (Our eyes are instruments necessary
for having objects visually appear to us and they are approximately where we
are— this is the basis of the metaphorical expression ‘as they [objects] appear to
the eye.’)
It might, finally, be objected that, as a matter of principle, anything that is
literally located in space must be physical. Therefore, either the experiments do
not determine where I am literally located in space, or I am, after all, something
physical. Anti-materialists, if they were forced to accept this purported dilemma,
would still be happy to embrace its first horn. But the objection flies straight
in the face of the fact that the experiments do seem to determine where I am
literally located in space, and the fact that at this location no physical entity
seems to be available that, with any plausibility, might be me. Clearly, one has
a choice here: either to stick to the above principle— considering it an a priori
premise— or to accept the conclusions which the phenomena, straightforwardly
interpreted, strongly suggest. I would advocate the latter— also because there are
other phenomena that point to strictly analogous (but not identical) conclusions.
These other phenomena are addressed in the next section.
2. W H E R E  IS T H IS  IT C H ?
Experience is full of illusions. Some of them are actually constitutive of an
entire region of experience, o f visual experience, say— for example, the all-
pervasive visual illusion that certain (actually separate) points coincide, o f which
the illusion that the moon is a luminous disk that is as big as a silver dollar
(or smaller) is just one particular outcome. Pervasive illusions— and illusions
that result from pervasive illusions under particular circumstances— are not
normally taken notice of by us when we have grown up. Hardly anybody but
a child, I suppose, would be fascinated by the illusion that, between tracks seen
from a fast-moving train, there is a dirt-colored torrent that runs in opposite
direction to the train’s movement. But some illusions— non-visual ones— are
so extraordinary that one can never fail to notice them as long as one labors
under them: phantom itch, phantom pain. The designations ‘phantom itch’ and
‘phantom pain’ are somewhat amiss, since phantom itches and phantom pains
are real enough— and so are their locations: the person who has a phantom
itch or pain can tell (and point to) where the itch sits, or the pain. The only
thing phantom about phantom itch and phantom pain is this: where these
bodily sensations are, there is no human bodily part in which they are (but,
usually, just thin air), though there seems to be such a part as long as one does
not look or (try to) touch; this alone is what makes phantom itch and pain
illusions.
Phantom itches and phantom pains only bring out in a particular striking
manner what holds true of all bodily sensations: Since they are where they are,
they cannot be physical entities, because, obviously, none of the physical entities
(that is, living tissue, cells, nerve-endings— or just molecules of nitrogen, oxygen,
and carbon dioxide) that are where the bodily sensations are can be identical with
them. (The analogy of this reasoning to the reasoning employed in section 1
should be evident.)
Bodily sensations are nonphysical entities; but, o f course, they are not inde­
pendent of the body: without certain physical things going on in the brain of the
person who has them, they would not exist. This, however, should not foster the
idea that bodily sensations might be identified with those cerebral goings-on.
The former cannot be the latter, because the latter do not have the right location
for that. I do not have an itch in my brain, I have it in the middle of the palm
of my left hand. And I can make the itch go away by rubbing the palm of my
left hand. In this, I am fortunate; there is no such easily obtainable relief for the
person who experiences a phantom itch.
I and my itch— both nonphysical— are depending for our nonphysical
existence on the body, specifically the brain. The difference between my itch and
me— besides the obvious difference (and its consequences in the given setting):
that the itch is an event and I a substance— is this: the location of my itch is
rather distant from its main causal source (the brain), while my own location is
rather near to it. Now, the reality o f phantom itches suggests the metaphysical
possibility of phantom selves. Like a phantom itch, a phantom self would be real
enough— and so would be its location: a phantom self would still see the world
(at a time) from where it is (at that time). The only thing phantom about a
phantom self would be this: where this self is, there is no human bodily part in
which it is (but, say, only thin air).
The ontological coherence of this idea is rather convincingly argued in
(Hart 1988). Moreover, if out-of-body experiences really occur— out-of-body
experiences in the strong sense, which are such that the person who undergoes
them sees (veridically sees) things that it could only have seen from a location,
say, a few meters away from her body (such experiences have been alleged by
near-death patients) —  then the subject that has these experiences is certainly a
real (and not only a possible) phantom self as long as these experiences last.
Further, if the experiments described in Section 1 located me entirely outside of
my body, my everyday existence would be that of a phantom self (in the described
sense)— and this would be our common lot (since there is certainly nothing
special about me and what the experiments determine with regard to me).
As this last consideration shows, even a phantom self is not ipso facto a self that
is independent of the body— just as not even a phantom itch is ipso facto an itch
that is independent of the body. As a matter of fact, phantom itches and phantom
pains— to the extent that their real occurrence is indisputable— depend for their
existence on a functioning brain. And the same is more than likely to be true of
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phantom selves— if there really are such things— even of the phantom selves in
out-of-body experiences (taken in the strong sense, if there be such experiences):
they would be selves ‘with a long tether,’ so to speak, but be causally linked
to a functioning brain nonetheless. It must, however, be admitted that the
nature of the non-local psychophysical causation that would be involved in such
phenomena is quite unknown.
3. W H E N  I R E M O V E  M Y G L A SSE S, W H A T  H A P P E N S ?
For some time, I have been sitting and looking fixedly at a white wall with the
black silhouette of a human figure on it. Being told to remove my glasses and to
keep looking at the wall as before, I do so. Instantly, the silhouette in front of me
looks different to me from what it looked when my glasses were still appropriately
positioned on my nose. The silhouette looks blurred to me. Before I removed
my glasses, in contrast, it looked sharp to me, although I did not, then, pay any
attention to this. I put on my glasses again. Instantly, the blurredness goes away
and is replaced by the former sharpness.
W hat is the ontologically correct description o f what is going on here? It
turns out that this description is surprisingly hard to find, for there are several
alternative descriptions, all of them with some initial plausibility:
( 1 ) Sharpness and blurredness succeed each other as properties of the silhouette
I am looking at: first, this silhouette is sharps then it is blurred, then it
is sharp again— However, it is rather unlikely that the mere removal of
my glasses from their customary place, and their subsequent restoration
to that place, should have such remarkable effects on the silhouette (four
meters in front of me). Moreover, the alleged succession of properties is
only observed by me, while other observers (needing no glasses) do not
perceive it.
(2) It’s not that sharpness and blurredness succeed each other as properties
of the silhouette, but there is, nonetheless, a succession of properties
with regard to the silhouette: looking sharp to me and looking blurred to
me succeed each other as (relational) properties o f the silhouette— This
is certainly correct, but far from answering all the questions. The main
question is this: during the whole episode, is there anything that is first
sharp (that is, first has the property of sharpness}, then blurred (that is, then
has the property of blurredness} and then sharp again— or is there not?
(3) During the whole episode there is nothing that first has the property of
sharpness, then the property of blurredness, and then, once more, the prop­
erty of sharpness— However, this does not seem plausible, since it seems
to be clearly the case that something that is sharp becomes blurred when I
remove my glasses, and becomes sharp again when I put them on again.
(4) During the whole episode something has the property of sharpness at first,
then the property of blurredness, then the property of sharpness once more.
But it is not the silhouette on the wall (cf. (1)); it’s my visual experience,
conceived of as an ongoing process (without an inherent terminus).
(4. 1) Alternatively, the matter can also be described as follows: first (in the order
of time), there is a section of my visual experience that is sharp, then comes
a section of my visual experience that is blurred, and then again comes a
section of my visual experience that is sharp.
If (4) and (4.1) are correct descriptions, how do they square with the equally
correct description (2)? The general relationship that is relevant to answering this
question is captured by the following schema:
(SI) The silhouette looks Fobj to me if, and only if, my visual experience7 of the
silhouette is Fexp-
This is correct. But the following, similar schema is incorrect (if taken at face
value: with the predicate F meaning the same on the left side of the ‘iff’ and on
the right):
(S2) The silhouette looks F to me if, and only if, my visual experience of the
silhouette is F.
But, notoriously, predicates are used homonymously, first with an objectivai and
then with an experiential meaning, to express an (SI )-relationship, making it seem
as if an (S2)-relationship is being asserted. And equally notoriously, philosophers
will point out to the conceptually unwary that they are speaking nonsense. Thus,
though the silhouette looks black (or colored, or thin, o r . . .) to me, my visual
experience of the silhouette is o f  course not black (or colored, or thin, or. . .).
But this does not refute what was really meant: that the silhouette looks blacky
(or coloredobj, or thinobj, o r . . .) to me if, and only if, my visual experience of
it is blackexp (or coloredexp , or thineXp, or. . .). Indeed, ‘black’ and ‘blackobj’ a r e
synonyms— but not, of course, also ‘black’ and ‘blackex p ’: ‘black’ and ‘blackobj
each stand for the property of blackness, whereas ‘b la c k y ’ stands for that
property of my visual experience of the silhouette that makes the silhouette look
black to me (that is, makes it seem to me as if the silhouette had the property
of blackness— as I have described matters, correctly so, since the silhouette was
assumed to be black in fact).
Although (S2) is false, it looks as if it had some true instances, for example,
the following two:
(S2.1) The silhouette looks blurred to me if, and only if, my visual experience
of the silhouette is blurred.
7 Alternatively: * the current section o f my visual experience . .
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(S2.2) The silhouette looks sharp to me if, and only if, my visual experience of
the silhouette is sharp.
But on, closer inspection, it seems more appropriate to say that in these
instances o f  (S2), too, predicates— ‘blurred,’ respectively sharp’— are being
used homonymously (first in the objectivai sense and then in the experiential).
Hence, what (S2.1) and (S2.2) are meant to say is more adequately expressed as
follows:
(S1.1) The silhouette looks blurredobj to me if, and only if, my visual experience
of the silhouette is blurredex p .
(SI.2) The silhouette looks sharpy  to me if, and only if, my visual experience
o f the silhouette is sharpex p .
Two comments (before I come to the conclusion of this section):
(i) If (Si .1) is to be true, then it is crucial that— other things held constant— we
stick to one particular objectivai meaning o f ‘blurred’: the one corresponding
to the experiential effect o f removing one’s glasses. For it may easily be that
the following is not true: the silhouette looks to me (for example) as i f  it
had a ( ‘physically) smeared outline (that is, looks to me blurred in another
objectivai sense than the one just mentioned) if, and only if, my experience of
the silhouette is blurred in the experiential sense heretofore solely considered
and held constant (that is, in the sense of the experiential effect o f removing
one’s glasses).
(ii) In the case o f ‘blurred’— in contrast to the case o f ‘black’— the experiential
meaning seems to be the primary one, such that ‘blurred’ and ‘blurredexp’
are synonyms and ‘blurred^;’ is a derived predicate (whereas in the case
of ‘black,’ ‘black’ and ‘blackobj’ are synonyms and ‘b la c k y ’ is a derived
predicate). For can an object be blurredobj that nobody ever looks at? It
seems not. (Note, in contrast, that there is no difficulty in assuming that an
object is blackobj that nobody ever looks at.)
Now the conclusion: while I sit looking at the white wall with the black silhouette
on it and remove my glasses and put them on again, not taking my eyes away
from the scene in front of me, something that is sharpexp is caused by this action
to become blurredexp> and then to become sharpexp again: my visual experience.
But no physical entity is caused by this action of mine to become either blurredexp
or sharpexp. In all of space—time nothing could with any likelihood be physical
and become blurredexp or sharpexp , brain-events not excluded— although, of
course, something physical is happening in my visual cortex that has causally to
do with the observed succession o f experiential properties and although, indeed,
some physical entity— for example, the silhouette— that looks sharpy  to me
is caused by the described action of mine to look blurredobj to me and then
to look sharpobj again. Hence, my visual experience, an ongoing process, is not
a physical entity. Nor can the successive sharpexp and blurredexp and sharpexp
sections of my visual experience be physical entities: these sections are events,
but physical events cannot be sharpexp or blurredex p . In consideration of the
fact that I, the subject o f my visual experience and of any section thereof,
exist non physically (see section 1), these results can only be considered befitting.
As a matter of fact, blurredness, and sharpness— or better: blurrednessexp and
sharpnessexp— are straightforward examples of what philosophers have become
accustomed to call qualia. Nothing physical has qualia. No wonder qualia are
denounced as epistemically inaccessible (‘mysterious’) by materialists (implying
their ontological dubiousness), but, as I hope the above considerations have
shown, quite wrongly so.
Some, rather than accept the nonphysical nature of my visual experience and
its sections, will undoubtedly prefer to deny that there is such an ongoing process
as visual experience and that there are such events as its sections, which stance is,
for example, adopted by Daniel Dennett: see his eliminativist rejection of ‘real
seemings’ in Dennett (1991). But I would urge that straightforward phenomena
be not denied. Some philosophers, however, apparently do not wish to deny
subjective experiential processes and events— episodes of being appeared to in
a certain way— but do not wish to admit their existence either; nor can such
philosophers be regarded as being agnostics regarding the matter in question.
The attitude described seems to be a rather difficult one (to say the least), an
attitude that, in the absence of positive evidence, one would not believe that
anyone might be attracted to. But in the following quotation it seems to be
adopted:
If A perceives an object O, then there was a perceiving of an O by A, and A  had a
perception of O. But these nominals introduce no new entities other than those already
presented by the simpler sentence *A perceives O’; they merely introduce convenient
façons de parler^ abstractions from the familiar phenomena. This does not mean that there
are not really any perceptions (or that pains, tickles or twinges do not really exist, or that
there are no hopes or fears). It means that there are, but that they are nor ‘entities’ or
kinds of things. (Bennett and Hacker 2003: 296)
This, on the face of it, is incoherent, since the statements ‘there are perceptions
(pains, tickles,. . .)’ and ‘perceptions (pains, tickles,. . .) exist’ just means (in
ordinary language) that there are entities which are perceptions (pains,. . .),
respectively, that entities exist which are perceptions (pains,. . .). However, I
take it what Bennett and Hacker— and other Wittgensteinians who, qua Wit-
tgensteinians, believe in the universal sufficiency and/or necessity of behavioral
criteria for the mental— really mean to say is simply this: that there really are no
such things as Cartesian perceptions and pains— namely, perceptions and pains
qua subjective experiential episodes (though there are certain façons de parler that
make it seem otherwise). Just like Dennett, they deny the inner or subjective
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world (textual evidence for this is ample throughout Bennett and Hacker’s book,
but can be found especially in chapters 10 and 11).
But one will not be able to do without the assumption of that inner world,
since behavioral criteria are neither sufficient nor necessary for perceptions,
pains, tickles, twinges, fears, and hopes, while the occurrence of certain subjective
experiential episodes is certainly at least necessary— that is, at least a conditio sine
qua non— for all of these things. And this is not an invention of Descartes, but a
mere matter o f the semantics ("the grammar’) of ordinary language. Let me make
this plain.
The mind of a solitary woman who lies motionless in the middle of a flowering
meadow, deep in the woods, on a sunny day is far from being empty. However,
of what is going on in her mind, only the tiniest fraction is shown in her face
or posture. She— Lady Jane— sees (the blinding light of the sun when her eyes
are open, a uniform redness when her eyes are closed); hears (the voices o f the
birds and the sound of the gentle wind); smells (the fragrance of flowers and
crushed plants); tastes-and-feels (her own spittle); feels tactilely (the texture of the
leaves and stalks of grass and herbs pressing into her thinly clad backside); feels
bodily (the relative dryness of her mouth, the sun’s heat, the relieving instant
coolness from the evaporation of her sweat, when one of those light gusts of
wind goes over her body); feels bodily-emotively (a sharp sexual yearning for John
Thomas); recalls (details of her last being together with John Thomas); fears (that
someone might come by and see her who is not John Thomas); hopes (that John
Thomas will come to her soon); thinks (fleetingly about what to tell Clifford,
later, when she returns home)— all o f this, and much more, is manifestly going
on in her mind as she lies motionlessly. And she is still lying motionlessly, her
heart pounding in her ears, when, on hearing someone approach through the
grass, she feels the experiential kick of the adrenaline that is released into her
body: feels as if she is falling into herself, into a bottomless pit which exhales a
metallic tasting coolness.
This story is told in ordinary English— a story that offers glimpses of a physical
environment and of a subjective mental life (of a "stream of consciousness’) in
contact with that environment. A description of behavior does not occur in that
story (except rudimentarily; there really is nothing properly behavioral there to
be described)— and yet every adult English-speaking reader (I trust) perfectly
understands the mental descriptions that occur in it, which descriptions refer
to complex inner episodes. They perfectly understand them because they have
had inner episodes similar to those described, or can easily imagine having
them.8
8 Further criticism of Wittgenstein’s all too influential ideas on psychological language can be
found in Meixner (2004).
4. A D E E P D IF F IC U L T Y
Straightforward phenomena should not be denied. But perhaps the phenomena
are not as straightforward as they seem to be. If my visual experience is
nonphysical, it yet remains true that it is experience o f  physical entities. Physical
entities are, as one is wont to say, intentional objects of my (and everyone else’s)
visual experience. How can this be? Obviously, physical objects cannot literally
be parts of something that is nonphysical. But if this tree, for example, is not
literally a part of the visual experience in which it appears to me, how, then, am
I and, in a more direct way, my experience intentionally (in the philosophical
sense) related to it? There is a tempting answer to this question: the tree is not
literally a part of my experience, but a representation of the tree is; this is how I
am intentionally related to the tree.
From the days of John Locke (at least) to this day, philosophers and scientists
have succumbed to the temptation of representationalism, the only modification in
the course of time being that representationalism, following the profound change
in metaphysical taste during the last century, was adapted to the requirements of
materialism. In other words, a neuronal representation of the tree is nowadays
held to be a literal part of a certain brain-process, and it is supposed that my
seeing rhe tree— my being in this way intentionally related to it— consists in
that tree-representation being a part of this brain-process. But all that can be
legitimately held on the basis of the empirical data is this: a neuronal causal
trace of the tree— a firing-pattern of neurons— is, at the end of a long and
complicated causal chain, a literal part of a brain-process without the occurrence
o f  which I would not be seeing the tree.
As Edmund Husserl has repeatedly emphasized,9 in visual experience we
are dealing directly with the visually experienced objects themselves, not with
representations of them. Note that we cannot (on pain of epistemological
absurdity) adopt the position that we are merely thinking that we are dealing
directly with the objects themselves, whereas in reality we are not doing so but
are dealing directly only with their representations; for if that were so, the route
to total skepticism regarding the physical world would be very short, since we
could never, as it were, get behind the screen of representations to check on their
veridicality. Representation in some sense— a causal sense, not in the sense of
semantic signification— must surely be involved in the causal mechanism that
makes visual intentionality possible; but it is not involved in the end-product,
9  A brief account of Husserl’s theory of intentionality, and a favorable comparison of it with
modern representationalist conceptions (of Fred Dretske and others), can be found in Meixner
(2006a).
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neither overtly (unless, of course, we are looking at a painting, a photograph,
a movie, etc.) nor in a hidden way. But the problem how physical objects can
be intentional objects of nonphysical visual experience is still with us. That
nonphysical images of physical objects are, in a literal sense, parts of experience
fails to do the trick, hardly less so than the idea that the object themselves are, in
a literal sense, parts of experience. W hat else can do the trick?
Husserl, without his ontological idealism, may be our inspiration here. The
following ideas are essentially Husserlian.10 Visual experience is the nonphysical
medium through which (by the organization of its hyletic content) the physical
objects of vision— normally existent, but sometimes non-existent— are inten­
tionally attained, visually grasped, so to speak. But that grasp is always only partial:
the physical objects of vision always transcend the visual experiences, since these
experiences give or present (not represent) those objects only in a perspectival,
aspectual manner, in other words: always give or present only a moment or side,
an abstract part of them (an Abschattung, says Husserl). In perspectivalpresence
and in the transcendence of perspectival presence— a transcendence, indeed, that
is implied at each moment by the perspectival presence itself— physical objects
are the intentional objects of nonphysical visual experience.
5. I, T H E  SAM E Y ESTERD A Y , TO D A Y , A N D  T O M O R R O W
Yesterday, I did U  and felt V; today, I do W  and feel X; tomorrow, I will do Y
and feel Z . This is shown by experience to be true for many U, V, W , X , Y, and
Z, and for many dates of temporal reference. Experience also shows it to be true
in the straightforward sense, namely, without a temporal counterpart o f me11— of
now-me, as it were— or a temporal part (stage) of m e12— of me-the-temporal-
aggregate, so to say— being required for its truth to do U  or Y  or feel V  or Z .
The next question is how the first sentence of this section can be true in this
straightforward sense. Clearly, for that sentence to be true in the straightforward
sense, I must be able to exist as numerically the same entity yesterday, today, and
tomorrow, without needing temporal parts or counterparts for this. W hat must
be my nature if I am to be able to exist in this way?
First, there must be a certain analogy between me and existing universals,
for example, the property o f being human. Clearly, that property is able to
exist— that is: to be exemplified by something existing— as numerically the
same entity yesterday, today, and tomorrow, without needing temporal parts
or counterparts for this. And in fact, that property existed yesterday, exists
today, and will exist tomorrow without having either temporal parts or temporal
counterparts— just like me.
10 See Husserl (1966). 11 Temporal counterparts are explored in Meixner (2002).
12 For advocacy of this approach, see Lewis (1986), for example.
Second, there must be a certain disanalogy between me and existing universals,
the example being again the property of being human. That property can be,
and is, exemplified (every human being is an exemplifier of it), while I  neither
am exemplified nor can be. The simple truth of the matter is that the property
of being human is a universal, and hence can be exemplified, while /  am not a
universal but an individual, and hence cannot be exemplified.
An individual that in its manner of existence through time is analogous to
existing universals may be called an endurant.^ I am an endurant*, this has
been established in the three previous paragraphs. I am, moreover, a subject o f
experience and action. This, too, has already been established: it is certainly true
that yesterday I did U  and felt V , that today I do W  and feel X . An endurant
that is a subject of experience and action has every right to be called a sentient
agent-substance. Hence, I am a sentient agent-substance— and a nonphysical one
at that, as was shown in section 1.
W hat is the basis of my nonphysical existence as a sentient agent-substance,
or in other words: as an endurant that is a subject of experience and action? As
is known, no atom in my body is part of my body during the entire span of
my existence. Hence the basis of my endurance cannot be purely material. It is
known that a certain structure is maintained in my brain during the entire time
of my existence; if that structure is no longer there, I have ceased to exist (in all
likelihood), even though my body, with outward assistance, may yet go on living
for a long time. But that structure is a complex universal that, in principle, is
capable of multiple exemplifications. Hence the basis of my endurance— of my
being an enduring individual— cannot be purely structural (or formal) either.
Clearly, the basis of my nonphysical existence as a sentient agent-substance is,
so to speak, material form al (or formal-material). But this, by itself, does certainly
not answer all the important questions. One would— or at any rate should like
to know the nomological foundation of the causal potential of the basis of my
nonphysical existence as an enduring subject o f experience and action, in other
words: the psychophysical laws that made my existence come about when the
world took a singular turn and prepared the basis for this existence. But, so far,
that nomological foundation is in its entirety terra incognita.
Moreover, the union of this matter— a certain huge collection of atoms with
this form— a certain mind-bogglingly complex manner of arranging atoms in
space— first brought forth the physical object in which my nonphysical existence
as a sentient agent-substance was, so to speak, kindled, in accordance with the
psychophysical laws of nature. Now, if, say, after a fairly long time but still
within my span of existence, those atoms and that manner of arrangement were
miraculously brought together again, then, in a sense,14 the very same physical
13 The source of this terminology is Mark Johnston, as is indicated in Lewis (1986: 202).
14 The emphasis is appropriate: remember the Ship o f Theseus. Would the ship rebuilt from the
old parts that were collected and safely stored over many years be the Ship of Theseus? In a sense,
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object would be reconstituted that had once been brought forth already. But
the soul that would be kindled in that physical object would certainly not be
me (since, obviously, it would not be where I am at the time); rather, it would
be comparable to the soul of a belated identical twin of mine.15 What, then,
individuates me? The answer is ready at hand: the place-and-time of my origin
is essential for my individuation; equivalently, my temporally specified history is
essential for my individuation. Therefore, this origin (or this history), in addition
to this matter and this form, are needed to differentiate me from every other soul.16
6. IS T H IS  C A R T E S IA N IS M ?
Yes and no. Yes, since what I have been arguing for in this chapter has some, not
inessential aspects in common with Cartesianism. No, since (1) Cartesianism
makes some substantial claims that are not condoned in this chapter; and (2) some
substantial claims are made in this chapter that contradict Descartes or are entirely
outside of his ken.
Against (what they regarded to be) the suspicion of being guilty of dualism,
various philosophers have reacted— in conversation with me— with the bizarre
claim that they are not dualists but pluralists. Presumably, this is directed against
the Cartesian dichotomy, according to which every res is either cogitans or extensa.
But, in a perfectly straightforward sense, even a dualist like Descartes is a pluralist.
For Descartes did not teach that cogitans and extensa are the only subdivisions of
the domain of res*, doubtless there are, also for Descartes, among the res extensae
such that are alive and such that are not. Hence there are, also for Descartes, at
least three kinds o f res-, cogitans, extensa et vivens, extensa et non-vivens. Evidently,
Descartes, too, is a pluralist (indeed, how could he not be a pluralist?)— and yet
he is a dualist.
This being said on behalf of Descartes, it should be noted that the kind of
dualism here advocated is not a dichotomous dualism in the Cartesian tradition.
It is not claimed that every entity is either mental or physical (for this, in my
eyes, is obviously false: the number 0 is neither mental nor physical). Nor is it
claimed that everything mental is nonphysical, because, for making such a claim,
yes. But in another sense, no. Consider that there is another ship, a ship afloat: the ship from which
the parts were gradually taken and replaced by new ones. That ship has as at least as good a right to
be the Ship of Theseus as the rebuilt ship.
15 But note that, normally, even identical twins are built from entirely distinct collections of
atoms. Clearly, more than just identical twinhood is involved in this doppelganger scenario. In
Peter van Inwagen’s more dramatic version of the thought-experiment, the man is confronted with
the reconstituted boy, each claiming— apparently with equal justification— that he is Peter van
Inwagen; see van In wagen (1997).
16 The usefulness of the concept of soul, also for scientific purposes, is defended in Meixner
(2006c) and in greater depth and detail in Meixner (2004).
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the meaning of the word ‘mental’ is far too fuzzy (in the obnoxious manner that
makes every precisification look more or less arbitrary). I claim, however, that
some existing mental entities are nonphysical entities (or, a different way to say
the same thing, that there exist nonphysical mental entities). And this is the thesis
that I stipulate be here referred to by the designation ‘psychophysical dualism,’
or ‘dualism’ for short (no other dualism than psychophysical dualism can be
meant in the present context). Moreover, in order to dissociate the discussion in
the philosophy of mind from misleading historical baggage (which has been a
vast disadvantage for dualists in the struggle with materialism), I recommend as a
general practice that psychophysical dualism be taken to consist in the thesis that
some existing mental entities are nonphysical entities, nothing more and nothing
less.17
This thesis of psychophysical dualism is vague also to the extent that the term
‘physical’ remains unanalyzed. I will not here offer such an analysis, but proceed
on the assumption that the term in question is sufficiently well understood.
A few elementary remarks, however, are absolutely necessary in order to avoid
confusion:
(i) ‘Physical’ may mean (1) entirely (or purely) physical-, or (2) at least partly phys­
ical-, correspondingly, ‘nonphysical’ may mean (1) at least partly nonphysical-,
or (2) entirely (orpurely) nonphysical. Obviously, nonphysicali is the negation
of physicali, nonphysical the negation ofp hysical2- In all purely ontological
contexts of this chapter, ‘physical’ (if occurring without the mentioned
modifiers) is to be taken in the sense of ‘physica^’ and ‘nonphysical’ (if
occurring without the mentioned modifiers) in the sense of ‘nonphysical-’
(ii) ‘Physical’ is, taken literally, an ontological term, but it can also be used
in an analogical sense, for example, as a semantic term when speaking of
‘physical predicates.’ Interestingly, the distinction made in (i) is also valid for
the semantic use o f ‘physical.’ Thus, by saying that a predicate is physical,
one can mean (1) that it is a purely physical predicate: that it has a purely
physical meaning (this latter phrase containing another analogical application
of the term ‘physical’); or (2) that it is an at least partly physical predicate:
that it has an at least partly physical meaning. Below, ‘physical’ will be used
semantically (hence analogically) with the first of the two meanings just
indicated.
Perhaps some may worry that the suggested conception of (basic) psychophysical
dualism is, regarding propositional (or logical) content, too weak to be interesting.
But it is easily seen that this is not so. The label ‘dualism’ is well-deserved by the
thesis that is proposed to express psychophysical dualism, since that thesis entails
that there is a nonphysical side of being— a second and complementary side, since
17 A detailed discussion of the question of what is to be understood by the designation
‘psychophysical dualism* can be found in Meixner (2004).
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it can be taken for granted that there is also a physical side of being and that every
entity is either physical or nonphysical. Materialists (or, to use the modern term,
physical is ts), though they take themselves to be opposed to ‘dualism/ often do
not have a clear idea of what they take themselves to be opposed to. If it turned
out, on reflection, that they take their own position not to be opposed to the
thesis that some existent mental entity is nonphysical, then one may well wonder
whether their position can properly (or honestly) be called ‘materialistic.’18
18 The point just made is urged in Meixner (2005 and 2008a).
19 An evolutionary explanation of this is provided in Meixner (2006b) and in greater depth and
detail— embedded in a theory of decision makers— in Meixner (2004). Objections are answered in
Meixner (2008b).
20 See Meditations, VI: 9. It is worth mentioning that Descartes explicitly distances himself
from that ancient analogy— see Aristotle’s query in De anima, II: I; Thomas Aquinas in 5. c.
G, II: 57, connects the analogy doctrinally with Plato— which even to these days is thought to
be representative of substance-dualism: the-navigator-in-the~ship analogy. Descartes: ‘Docet etiam
natura, per istos sensus doloris, famis, sitis &c„ me non tantum adesse meo corpori ut nauta
adest navigio, sed illi arctissime esse conjunctum & quasi permixtum adeo ut unum quid cum illo
componam’ {Meditations, VI: 13; quoted from Descartes (1986)).
That psychophysical dualism consists in the indicated thesis does of course
not preclude that it can be enriched in all sorts o f ways; one such enrichment
of psychophysical dualism is Cartesian dualism; another such enrichment is the
kind of psychophysical dualism that I have defended in this chapter on empirical
grounds. I call this dualism ‘empirical dualism.’
Both according to empirical dualism and Cartesian dualism, I am an existent
nonphysical mental substance (mental I am qua being a subject o f experience).
And both according to empirical dualism and Cartesian dualism, my experiences
are existent nonphysical mental events (although, it must be noted, event-dualism
is not as explicit in Descartes’ work as substance-dualism; event-dualism can,
however, be rather effortlessly distilled from his main work, the Meditations),
Descartes is notorious for not according the status of (dualistically conceived)
mentality to other than human animals. Empirical data show, however, that he
was wrong in this: experience— which cannot be without a subject of experience,
which subject, in turn, is more than likely to function also a subject o f action— is
widespread throughout the animal kingdom.19
Since the time Cartesian dualism made its appearance on the stage of the history
of philosophy, many have felt that psychophysical dualism is burdened with a
huge load of demands for explanation— a load so heavy that psychophysical
dualism can only sink under it. For this overly critical attitude, empirical
ignorance is in part responsible, and in part philosophical unfairness. Even
Descartes himself asserted that the body is very closely joined to the self
or soul— mihi valde arcte coniunctum est.20 Knowing next to nothing about
psychophysical correlations, Descartes was, like everyone else for a long time to
come, not in a position to make good on this assertion. But it is true, nonetheless,
that body and soul, though distinct, are very closely joined, so closely as to form
a unified entity— still an unum quid (compare the quotation from Descartes in
footnote 20), though not the unity that the psychophysical Unitarians assume
the human person to be (see below). And for the first time in human history
we are beginning to be able to show that Descartes’ assertion is true. W ith the
increasing amount of knowledge about psychophysical correlations, the feeling
that psychophysical dualism unduly separates the mental and the physical— to
the point that, absurdly, the two seem to have nothing whatever to do with each
other, that there seems to be an unbridgeable gulf between them— is bound
to diminish. O f course, this positive effect o f increasing empirical knowledge
will only be felt by those who give dualism a chance to begin with, and do not
safeguard themselves against it by philosophical unfairness.
W hat is it, in particular, that I mean by ‘philosophical unfairness’ here?
It is philosophically unfair— and misguided— to demand explanations that
go beyond the indication of lawful correlations, and then to complain that
psychophysical dualism can’t provide such explanations, and then to urge that psy­
chophysical dualism must, therefore, be discarded. One might as well demand an
explanation of gravity that goes beyond the indication of the precise lawful correl­
ation between the masses of physical objects and their distance from each other on
the one hand, and the gravitational force they exert on each other on the other. No
such explanation is forthcoming (the general theory of relativity does not provide
it). Does this make it incumbent upon us to give up the idea that a physical object
and its gravitational field are distinct entities (insofar as they could, metaphysic­
ally (not nomologically), each exist, such as they are in themselves, without the
other)? Certainly not. And in fact nobody is complaining that physics is making a
misplaced mystery out of the relationship between material objects and their grav­
itational fields just by considering them distinct entities (in the indicated sense).
Neither should anyone complain that dualism makes a misplaced mystery out of
the relationship between certain living bodies and their mental fields, so to speak,
just by considering them distinct entities (insofar as they could, metaphysically
(not nomologically), each exist, such as they are in themselves, without the other).
Another frequent complaint against Cartesian-type psychophysical dual­
ism— and empirical dualism, though not Cartesian, is certainly of Cartesian
type— is the complaint that it makes the direct and literal ascription of phys­
ical predicates to, for example, me impossible. But, first, this is not invariably
impossible: as we have seen, a predicate of being at a certain spatial location (at a
certain time) can be literally and directly ascribed to me, although I am a nonphys­
ical entity. Second, with regard to other cases, where indeed a physical predicate
cannot be literally and directly ascribed to me, which predicate, however, one
would nevertheless want to ascribe to me (for example, ‘to have a mass of 85 kg’),
it should be remembered that nothing is wrong with the following biconditional:
I [analogically] <p if, and only if, my body [literally] <ps— for all physical predicates (p that
cannot be literally and directly ascribed to me.
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The empirical dualist takes this biconditional to formulate a rule of analogical
predication, which governs the analogical and indirect (that is, secondary)
ascription o f physical predicates to me that cannot literally and directly (that
is, in the primary way) be ascribed to me, but which one would nevertheless
want to ascribe to me. For the empirical dualist, the analogical ascription of such
predicates is good enough.
It should be noted that for those materialists who identify me with my
body the above biconditional is not a rule of analogical predication, but, for all
predicates (py a consequence of Leibniz’s Law: the predicate-ascriptions on both
sides of the biconditional are regarded as literal and direct. Those materialists,
however, who identify me with my brain or some part thereof are also forced to
resort to analogical ascriptions, according to the rule of analogical predication
stated above (but now being referred to the context that is created by their
hypothesis about my nature); for the predicate ‘to have a mass of 85 kg/ which
one would want to ascribe to me, obviously cannot be literally and directly be
ascribed to me if I am my brain or some part thereof. Finally, for those who take
me to be a psychophysical unity, the above biconditional is also not a rule of
analogical predication, but nevertheless true for all physical predicates <py with the
predicate-ascriptions being literal and direct on both sides of the biconditional.
Like the body-materialist— but unlike the brain-materialist— the psychophysical
unitariari21 believes that my mass is as literally and directly 85 kg as the mass of
my body is literally and directly 85 kg. This may seem a very attractive option.
However, its attractiveness cannot suffice to dislodge empirical dualism, which
can speak of my mass being 85 kg only in an analogical and secondary way,
but nevertheless can speak o f  it. It cannot suffice in consideration of the fact
that empirical observations (see section 1) show me to be literally where neither
body-materialists nor brain-materialists, nor psychophysical Unitarians have any
means— either analogical or literal ones—-of saying truly that I am there.
Besides predicates that are physical-— that is: purely physical— there are
predicates that are indeed not physical, but not psychological— that is: purely
psychological— either; this is just a matter of the semantics of ordinary language.
The most important one of these predicates is truthfully ascribed to me in the
next sentence. I  am a human being. For materialists, ‘human being’ can only be
a physical predicate after all, meaning as much as the predicate ‘human body?
Then, human being’ can be literally and truthfully ascribed to me according
to the body-materialist (because it is literally true that my body— which I
21 Modern hylemorphists like to see themselves as psychophysical Unitarians— and Thomas
Aquinas as well (for example, Klima (2007)), which, however, does not quite seem to do justice
to the historical truth. An epitome of modern psychophysical unitariamsm, in any case, is P. M.
S. Hacker. Psychophysical unitarianism is not a monism (since psychophysical Unitarians will
acknowledge that there also exist purely physical entities), and it is not a form of psychophysical
dualism either (since psychophysical Unitarians will deny that there exist nonphysical— that is,
purely nonphysical— mental entities).
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am identical to, according to the body-materialists— is a human body), not,
however, according to the brain-materialist (obviously). But is it true that ‘human
being’ is a physical predicate, or that it should be taken to be such a predicate?
Psychophysical Unitarians deny this— rightly. For them, ‘is a human being’
logically entails ‘is a psychophysical unity? Psychophysical dualists do not quite
follow the Unitarians in this, although ‘human being’ is, of course, also for dualists
not a physical predicate, and although, normally, it is for them not a psychological
predicate either (an exception being Plato and his followers— at least in the eyes
of Thomas Aquinas;22 in their own way, such dualists contradict the conceptual
framework of ordinary language as much as the materialists do). For dualists
(leaving aside Aquinas’s Platonic dualists), ‘is a human being’ logically entails
only ‘is a unified entity of physis and psyche*23 and not ‘is a psychophysical unity.
However, the dualistic conceptual option does remain within the bounds of
the semantics of ordinary language (the naturalness of dualism within natural
language is, as a rule, grossly underestimated by Unitarian Wittgensteinians, like
P. M. S. Hacker). Moreover, the dualistic option seems to be better adapted
than the Unitarian one to what the empirical phenomena (some of which have
been described in this chapter) tell us about us— so much better that we can well
accept that ‘human being’ is only being analogically and indirectly ascribed to
me when I say of myself‘I am a human being? my literal meaning being that I
am the nonphysical substantial core o f a unified entity o f physis and psyche that is
of human kind.
22 See S. c. G., II: 57, ‘Plato posuit quod homo non sit aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore:
sed quod ipsa anima utens corpore sit homo.’
23 It should be carefully noted that it is, according to Cartesian as well as empirical dualists,
essential (that is, conceptually existence-essential) for a human being to be a unified entity of physis
and psyche: it is conceptually (and hence metaphysically) impossible for a human being to exist
without being such an entity. This does not mean, however, that it is essential for the physis and the
psyche of a human being to be unified and constitute the unified entity which is a human being:
according to Cartesian as well as empirical dualists, it is metaphysically (and hence conceptually)
possible for the psyche, and for the physis, of a human being to exist without being a constituent of
any human being. (For my views on essentiality and on metaphysical and conceptual (im)possibility,
see Meixner (2006d).)
